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This article deals with the attitudes of Arabs and Jews in Israel regarding a Palestinian state. These include 
their images of such a state, the costs and benefits perceived if a Palestinian state were established, and the 
fears and desires involved, including the desire to keep contact with the Palestinian population in the 
various life domains. The article will attempt to analyze the extent to which the attitudes toward the 
establishment of a Palestinian state and its likely character derive from a rational calculus of expected costs 
and benefits to one's own group. 
 
   In the present case, it is obvious that the calculus of self-interest is different for each of 
the two groups. It is safe to suggest that Israeli Jews regard their state both in contractual and 
communal terms (Kimmerling 1985; Liebman 1989). Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, regard 
the state in contractual terms, but do not see it as a frame for community. Rather, being a 
minority, Israeli Arabs have a communal affinity for culture and kinship with fellow 
Palestinians outside of Israel. In constructing their attitudes toward the prospect of a 
Palestinian state, therefore, one might expect the Jews to evaluate its worth only in terms of 
cost-benefit considerations for themselves. Israeli Arabs, on the other hand, might consider 
not only their own immediate self-interest but also the interests of their kinsmen elsewhere. 
However altruistic, such concern may reflect a long-run self-interest as well, based on the 
enhanced identity that derives from communal association with a nation-state.  
Our findings are derived from four waves of the continuing survey of the Guttman 
Institute (May 1989, July 1990, November 1990, May 1991). Each wave of the survey was 
based on a representative sample of the Israeli population 20 years of age and over, including 
about 1,200 Jewish and 250 Arab respondents. This article is based on that part of the 
questionnaire that examines support for a Palestinian state by Jews and Arabs, respectively. It 
looks at the perception by each group of the benefits that a Palestinian state is likely to bring 
(1) to each of three potential beneficiaries—Israeli Jews, Israeli Arabs, and Arabs in the 
occupied territories, and (2) in each of three areas of concern—security, economics, and 
social interaction. 
 
 BACKGROUND 
 
Israel is a pluralistic society composed of different ethnic, national, and religious groups. 
Undoubtedly, the Jewish-Arab division is the deepest one and the most complicated. These 
two groups differ in ethnicity, religion, language, culture, and national aspirations. 
Arabs are outside of the Jewish national consensus in Israel as far as nation-state building 
(in many of its aspects), ingathering of exiles, absorption of immigration, and other cardinal 
issues are concerned. Most of the interpersonal relations between Arabs and Jews in Israel are 
formal and technical, characterized by asymmetric minority-majority relations (Mari 1988; 
Smooha 1989). 
Since the establishment of the state of Israel, the collective identity of the Arabs living 
there has been affected by several contradictory factors. On one hand, they are part of the 
Arab world, particularly of the Palestinian people, in terms of language, nationality, and 
cultural symbols. On the other hand, they are Israeli citizens struggling for civic equality and 
promoting their status. In this sense, the Arab citizens have two main reference groups. At the 
national level, they are affected by the Palestinians and those who live in Arab countries that 
are in continuous conflict and tension with Israel. At the citizenship level, they are affected 
by the Jewish majority that controls the national power center and determines the division of 
resources (Al-Haj 1991). 
Although Jews in Israel have maintained a national consensus on the aforementioned 
cardinal issues, there has always been a dispute among them regarding the appropriate way 
for the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the desired nature of their relationship with 
the Palestinians. This dispute has grown wider since the occupation of the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip in 1967 (see Lissak 1990). 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Our findings reveal that the dispute between Arabs and Jews regarding the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not restricted to the issue of annexation versus yielding 
territories. Rather, it extends to the question of what kind of Palestinian entity should be 
established in the territories. Although the vast majority of Arabs support the creation of a 
full-fledged Palestinian state alongside the state of Israel, the majority of Jews reject this 
option. 
Figure 1 indicates that support of the Israeli public for the establishment of a Palestinian 
state is essentially stable over time. When Arabs and Jews are combined as a national sample, 
about one-third of the Israeli public may be said to favor a Palestinian state. However, as 
indicated earlier, a wide gap exists between Jews and Arabs over this issue. Among the 
former, the percentage of those supporting a Palestinian state was 20 in May 1989, 22 in July 
1990, and 17 in November 1990. In May 1991, it increased once again to its previous level 
(22%). 
 The drop in support in November 1990 for a Palestinian state among Jews may be 
explained against the background of the Gulf crisis. This crisis brought a considerable 
decrease in the sympathy of the Zionist left for the Palestinian issue. The Gulf crisis 
highlighted the opposing orientation of Arabs and Jews in Israel; each group identified with a 
different side in the conflict. For Jews, the clear-cut decision was to identify with the Allies 
led by the United States. For Palestinians, the decision was much more complicated. 
Although some condemned the occupation of Kuwait by Iraq as a way of settling conflict 
between Arab countries, the vast majority of Palestinians supported the linkage declared by 
Iraq between the Kuwaiti case and the Palestinian issue, in the sense that Saddam Hussein 
should not withdraw from Kuwait until the Palestinian case is settled (see Al-Hamishmar 
February 1, 1991). 
 
 
 
 
Unlike the Jews, the Arabs of Israel overwhelmingly support a Palestinian state. By 
adopting a "two state solution," Arabs think that all groups involved would benefit, including 
Jews in Israel. This fact is reflected in answers to the following question: "If there were a 
Palestinian state, what would be the future situation, compared with today, of Jews in 
Israel/Arabs in Israel/Arabs in the territories, in terms of their personal security? Economic 
situation? Social situation?" 
As shown in Table 1, Israel's Arabs believe that a Palestinian state would improve the 
situation of all parties, even if they believe that their Palestinian brethren in the territories 
would benefit most. The Arabs have a global perception regarding the potential impact of a 
Palestinian state and, in this context, do not differentiate among the several fields: personal 
safety, economic situation, and social situation. In other words, Arabs have very high positive 
expectations from a Palestinian state.  
 Unlike the Arabs, Jews are more cautious and negative in their assessment concerning 
the impact of a Palestinian state. Overall, they think that, for Jews in Israel, the situation will 
be worsened as far as personal safety and economic situation are concerned. When asked 
about the potential repercussions of a Palestinian state on their social situation, the Jews 
divide almost equally. Jews acknowledge that the social situation of the Arabs in the 
territories and those living in Israel would improve if there were a Palestinian state, but 
believe that their economic situation would worsen. 
 
 
 
 
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS: EXTRACTING BASIC CONCEPTS THAT GOVERN 
ATTITUDES 
 
Another way to examine these data is in terms of the "attitude space" implied by the data. 
The structure of that space may be studied by Faceted Smallest Space Analysis (FSSA) (Shye 
1978, 1991; Shye, Denesh, and Sharashor 1991). FSSA is a nonmetric, multivariate technique 
for mapping observed variables (e.g., questionnaire items) in accordance with the correlations 
between them. The attitude space obtained by the FSSA maps is studied with respect to 
correspondences between its sub-regions on one hand and content classifications of the 
variables on the other. In a variety of studies, FSSA maps have been found useful in decoding 
political attitudes (see Shye, Denesh, and Sharashor 1991; Russett and Shye 1993 for a recent 
example). Figures 2 and 3 show the FSSA maps obtained for Arab and Jewish samples, 
respectively. Both maps are based on the same set of twelve variables and can be partitioned 
into four meaningful regions (clockwise): 
The partitionings of the maps into four regions can be shown to be the product of two 
more elementary partitionings: By a geographic criterion, the space can be divided according 
to whether reference is made to Israel itself (Israeli Jews, region II; Israeli Arabs, region III), 
or to the territories (Palestinian state, region I; Arabs in territories, region IV). Secondly, by a 
social organizational criterion, a further division can be made according to whether reference 
is made to a majority state (Palestinian state, region I; Israeli Jews, region II), or to a minority 
community (Israeli Arabs, region III; Arabs in territories, region IV). 
That this same pattern of partitioning is repeated in both samples, the Arab and the 
Jewish, attests to its stability across populations and provides evidence for possible structural  
lawfulness. Hence the FSSA maps empirically validate the conceptual distinction between 
Israel (within the Green Line) and the territories; and between two kinds of social 
frameworks, the formal (state), and the informal (community).  
 
  
 
Region I: Support for a Palestinian state (in general, var #l; in the West Bank, #11; in the 
Gaza strip, #12) 
Region II: Expected benefit to Israeli Jews (personal security, #8; economically, #9; 
socially, #10) 
Region III: Expected benefit to Israeli Arabs (personal security, #2; economically, #3; 
socially, #4) 
Region IV: Expected benefit to Arabs in territories (personal security, #5; economically, 
#6; socially, #7) 
 
Another feature worth noticing is that in both correlation matrices (that serve as input to 
the FSSA procedure), practically all coefficients are positive or zero. Hence, by and large, the 
more one sees the Palestinian state as beneficial to one group, the more likely one is to 
consider it beneficial to all other groups (and in every respect examined—security, economic, 
and social), and, also, the more likely one is to support a Palestinian state. (The one exception 
to this general picture is embodied in slightly negative correlations observed in the Jewish 
sample between the expected economic benefit for Israeli Jews and that expected for Arabs in 
the territories; that is, some potential competition, though minor, is anticipated.) 
 
 
IS SUPPORTING A PALESTINIAN STATE A FUNCTION OF ITS BENEFITS? 
 
 Against the background of these underlying commonalities, it is of special interest to 
examine differences between the two samples, the Arabs and the Jews. For the Jews, support 
of a Palestinian state is dictated first and foremost by self-interest, particularly their own 
security considerations. Correlations between expected benefits to Israeli Jews and support of 
a Palestinian state are high: .73 with enhanced personal security, .42 and .53 with economic 
and social improvement, respectively. Expected benefits to the Arab populations in Israel or 
in the territories contribute much less to Jewish support of a Palestinian state—the relevant 
correlations range between .08 and .28 (see Table 2). 
For the Israeli Arabs it seems that the primary motivation for supporting a Palestinian 
state is the benefits that would accrue not to themselves, but to the Arabs in the territories: 
expected benefits to the latter correlate .81, .61, and .64, respectively, with support of 
Palestinian state. The self-interest of Israeli Arabs takes only second place with the 
corresponding coefficients of .58, .46, and .42, respectively (see Table 3). Apparently, the 
commitment of Israeli Arabs and their identification with their brethren across the Green Line 
play major roles in determining their support for a Palestinian state. This, however, need not 
imply suspension of their own self-interest, which may well be served by the Palestinian state 
in terms of a strengthened national identity. 
 
THE IMAGE OF THE PALESTINIAN STATE 
 
As in the case of cost-benefit expectations of a Palestinian state, when asked about the 
image of such a state, a wide gap also emerged between Arabs and Jews. The former believe 
that a Palestinian state will prove to be democratic and peaceful to Israel (see Table 4), 
whereas Jews think the opposite. Most Jews are convinced that such a state would not be 
democratic and would seek to annex parts from Israel. Also, the vast majority of Jews think 
that a Palestinian state would be of Islamic character. Arabs are divided over this latter issue;  
 
 
 
53% think that the Islamic character would be a dominant element in a future Palestinian 
state.  
These findings may explain why most Jews perceive a Palestinian state as a security risk. 
In the eyes of Jews, a nondemocratic, Islamic state that seeks to annex parts of Israel spells a 
continuous source of instability. However, Palestinians have repeatedly emphasized that a 
Palestinian state cannot constitute a threat to Israel, not only because of the social and 
economic problems such a state would face, but because it would be small, with only limited 
military and strategic power (Sahliyeh 1991, 14). 
These attitudes are reflected also in the desired character of such a state in the eyes of 
Arabs. We asked respondents to answer the following question: "Imagine a situation in which 
a Palestinian state is established alongside the state of Israel; to what extent do you desire that 
this state be democratic? Of Islamic character? Seek to annex territories from Israel?" 
Ninety-one percent of Arab respondents indicated that they strongly desire or desire that a 
Palestinian state be democratic and only 19% expressed their desire that such state should 
seek to annex Israeli territories. As for the Islamic character of a Palestinian state, one-third 
of the respondents expressed such a desire. It is worth mentioning that Jews see a 
contradiction between a democratic and Islamic state, whereas Arabs do not think that such a 
negative relationship necessarily exists. 
A survey conducted in May 1991 among the Palestinians in the territories revealed a 
similar picture regarding the desired character of a Palestinian state. The majority of 
Palestinian respondents (76%) preferred a democratic system and 54% preferred a multiparty 
system. At the same time, 47% said that the preferred ideology is the religious one 
(Haj-Yehia 1992, 13). 
If we are to judge according to these attitudes, we might hypothesize that a Palestinian 
state would adopt a model of democracy similar to the Israeli one, which is not inimical to 
religion. In other words, although this state would not be ruled by the Sharia (religious laws), 
it might be difficult to expect a clear separation between state and religion. 
With respect to settlement of the Palestinian issue, Jews in Israel are divided concerning 
their will to keep contact with the Palestinian population, with a substantial part (40% to 
50%) of them claiming they want to keep contact with Palestinians in the different fields 
(Table 5). As in the case of support for a Palestinian state, here, too, there was a drop in the 
desire to keep contact with Palestinians on the eve of the Gulf War and, once again, an 
increase after the war. This is another indication that the anxiety of the Israeli population 
during the war decreased shortly after the cease fire, when life was back to normal. In this 
sense, the fears existing prior to the Gulf War have affected the attitudes of Israeli Jews 
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict much more than the war itself. 
 
 
 
The second point has to do with the ordering of the different fields of desired contact. 
Interestingly, the several waves of the survey revealed that the Jews rank social contact with 
Palestinians as more attractive than cultural or economic contact. Jews feel estrangement 
from the Palestinian-Arab culture, in which they see the Islamic element as central. In 
addition, Jews prefer contact with Western European, rather than Arab Middle Eastern 
culture (Shye, Tzemah, and Bar 1988, 23). Likewise, as shown in Table 1, Jews think that 
they will benefit more socially than economically as a result of the establishment of a 
Palestinian state. This finding reflects the fact that whereas some Jews (e.g., the eastern, those 
originating in Arab countries) are not averse to social contact with Palestinians, they do 
foresee economic competition between Israel and the Palestinian state, possibly because of 
the (currently experienced) cheaper Arab labor. 
Unlike Jews, the vast majority of Arabs said they want to maintain all types of contact 
with the Palestinians. The most desired field of contact for Arabs is the sociocultural. It may 
seem surprising that economic contact is always ranked lower. This is because Arabs in Israel 
see their linkage with the Palestinians as mainly connected to their national and cultural 
bonds. In fact, there have been no considerable economic relations between the Palestinians 
across the Green Line. Economic relations between the Palestinians in Israel and the 
territories have been marginal since 1967, and both groups are dependent on the Israeli 
economy, which is controlled by the Jewish majority (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1986). 
Clearly, the attitudes of Israeli Arabs toward a Palestinian state reflect their complex 
Israeli-Palestinian identity. Although the vast majority of Israeli Arabs support a Palestinian 
state and strongly desire contact with the Palestinians, some 70% say that even if a 
Palestinian state were established, they would not leave Israel to live there. They would rather 
continue to be Israeli citizens and struggle for their civil rights (see Al-Haj 1991, 25). 
However, this is not exactly what Jews think about the intentions of Arabs. Some 65% of 
Jews said that Arabs would move to a Palestinian state if one were established.  
The question arises of whether there is a relationship between the attitudes of the Jewish 
majority toward the establishment of a Palestinian state and toward future contact with 
Palestinians, on one hand; and the image they have of such a state on the other? In other 
words, are the attitudes of Jews toward a Palestinian state totally ideological, or are they 
affected by cost-benefit considerations as well? To answer this question, we examined the 
correlations among the attitudes toward a Palestinian state, attitudes toward contact with 
Palestinians, and the image of such a state. 
Table 6 shows a significant relationship between the attitudes of Jews in Israel towards a 
Palestinian entity and the image they have of that entity. The most meaningful for the Jewish 
public is the democratic character of a Palestinian state and the potential security danger it 
might present to Israel. The perceived Islamic character is also important, but it is not as 
important as the former elements. The more a Palestinian state is perceived as democratic and 
the less threatening to Israel, the more the Jews support its establishment and desire contact 
with Palestinians in the different fields. 
To summarize, our findings show that Arabs and Jews in Israel have a contradictory 
image of a Palestinian state. Whereas the former have a positive image and high expectations 
of a future Palestinian state, the latter have a negative image and think that such a state would 
present a threat to Israeli security. In addition, Palestinians in Israel would like to see a 
democratic Palestinian state that manages to keep a balance between state and religion.  
Our findings reveal that the attitudes of the Jewish public toward the Palestinians as a 
whole and a Palestinian state in particular are strongly affected by cost-benefit considerations 
and future images of a Palestinian state. The findings reiterate that the value of community is 
very strong in the political culture of Israeli Jews (see also Kimmerling 1985; Liebman 1989). 
This leads to the conclusion that intermediate arrangements that contribute to confidence 
building between Israelis and Palestinians and highlight the security benefits to be derived 
would greatly affect the Jewish public and enhance the prospect of a permanent solution for 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.  
For the Arabs, the establishment of a Palestinian state with normal relations with Israel 
will satisfy not only their concern for their larger community but also the enhancement of 
their identity. In this sense, the Palestinian state for Israeli Arabs—who have no intention of 
moving—there will serve not so much as a contractual frame but as a communal frame. 
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